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Abstract 
Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have been studied and results 
indicate that there is a large array of highly-beneficial applications.  
These applications are too numerous to list, but include search and rescue, 
fire spotting, precision agriculture, etc. to name a few.  Typically sUAS 
vehicles weigh less than 55 lbs and will be performing flight operations in 
the presence of manned aircraft and other sUAS. Certain sUAS 
applications, such as package delivery, will include operations in the close 
proximity of the general public.  The full benefit from sUAS is contingent 
upon the resolution of several technological areas to enable free and wide-
spread use of these vehicles.  Technological areas in question include, but 
are not limited to: autonomous sense and avoid and deconfliction of sUAS 
from other sUAS and manned aircraft, communications and interfaces 
between the vehicle and human operators, and high-reliability 
autonomous systems.  The NASA UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project 
is endeavoring to develop a traffic management system and concept of 
operations for these types of vehicles.  An extensive sUAS flight test effort 
was performed to partially address vehicle-related technological areas 
and to shape an understanding of future developmental and test efforts for 
vehicles intended to use the UTM traffic management system.  The flight 
testing described herein had the following objectives: 1) Install and test 
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) systems developed for 
the automotive industry for potential sense and avoid sUAS applications; 
2) Evaluate the use of cellular 4G systems to provide vehicle control; 3)
Obtain high-resolution video imagery in support of image-based optical
detection sense and avoid systems; 4) Acquire data in fixed-wing flight to
support validation and maturation of an autonomous range containment
system known as Safeguard in fixed-wing flight.  A total of 53 flights were
performed over 12 operational days at Beaver Dam Airpark in Elberon,
VA.  This work was sponsored by the UTM project that is part of the
Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) at NASA.
1
Nomenclature 
Amp Hour Ah, unit of measure of the 
amount of battery capacity 
AGL Above Ground Level 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
BVLOS Beyond Visual Line of Sight 
C2 Command and Control 
CID Cell tower ID 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
d Computed distance between two 
GPS coordinates 
DSRC Dedicated Short-Range 
Communication systems 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FOV Horizontal Field of View 
GA General Aviation 
GCS Ground Control Station 
GCSO Ground Control Station 
Operator 
ID Identification 
IOD Image-based Object Detection 
𝜆𝜆 Difference in longitude for 
vehicles 1 and 2 
LiPO Lithium Polymer Battery 
MR Multi-Rotor 
NAS National Air Space 
ppd Pixels per degree 
𝜑𝜑1 Latitude for vehicle 1 
𝜑𝜑2 Latitude for vehicle 2 
SAA Sense and Avoid 
sUAS Small Unmanned Aerial System 
R Radius of the earth 
R/C Radio Control 
RF Radio Frequency 
ROI Region of Interest 
RSO Range Safety Officer 
RSRP Reference Signal Received 
Power 
RSRQ Reference Signal Received 
Quality 
RTL Return to Launch 
UTM UAS Traffic Management 
WVLOS Within Visual Line of Sight 
Introduction 
The introduction of small unmanned aerial 
systems (sUAS) into the National Airspace System 
(NAS) has been an objective of several efforts.  It has 
been widely realized that sUAS (i.e.; those that weigh 
less than 55lbs) can provide tremendous benefit to 
mankind.  Those benefits include a large and growing 
array of applications from traffic monitoring to fire 
spotting and even small package delivery.  In order for 
sUAS to reach their full potential, several 
technological issues need be resolved in order to avoid 
exposing the general public to undue risks from sUAS 
operations.  These risks include those involving mid-
air collisions, both with manned aircraft as well as 
other sUAS, and also include risks associated with 
people and property on the ground.  One area of 
technological development is a traffic management 
system that can deconflict sUAS from each other as 
well as provide general limitations to where the 
vehicles can operate to help partially mitigate, but not 
eliminate, the risk to manned aircraft.  The NASA 
UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project has been 
developing a traffic management system for sUAS 
along with a concept of operations (CONOPS) as 
described in Reference 1. 
Presently, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) permits limited within visual line of sight 
operations under Part-107 regulations.  SUAS 
operators are permitted to operate their aircraft within 
visual line of sight (WVLOS) along with several other 
limitations such altitudes less than 400 ft above ground 
level (AGL), speeds less than 100 mph and operational 
locations sufficiently far away from airports.  General 
WVLOS visual limitations range out to ~1 mile 
depending on the size of the vehicle. While WVLOS 
operations can provide substantial benefit and include 
applications such as construction monitoring, real 
estate, and limited precision agriculture and 
infrastructure monitoring and other tasks, substantially 
more valuable and beneficial applications require the 
sUAS to be operated beyond visual line of sight 
(BVLOS) and/or include multiple sUAS operated by a 
single person.  Currently, the FAA does issue waivers 
to Part-107 requirements if the applicants can provide 
a valid safety case regarding their specific operation.  
Waivers are time consuming and comprehensive FAA 
regulations regarding routine BVLOS operations are 
needed.  While a focus of the UTM project is on the 
development of a prototype UTM air traffic 
management system and associated CONOPS, efforts 
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within the UTM project to develop the required on-
vehicle technologies are also being pursued. 
While operating WVLOS, the human operator is 
responsible for assuring that the sUAS will not collide 
with manned aircraft or other sUAS, avoid overflight 
of unprotected people on the ground, and be able to 
intervene in the event of vehicle system issues.  
Operations BVLOS place an added emphasis on the 
vehicles’ systems as real-time human intervention is 
much harder or even impossible in some situations. 
Technological barriers to BVLOS and multi-sUAS 
per operator operations include, but are not limited to: 
1) autonomous sense and avoid of other sUAS and 
manned aircraft, 2) communications and control, 3) 
highly-reliable autonomous systems, among other 
areas. 
Elements that sUAS have in common with other 
aircraft are that they need to perform a mission within 
a certain level of risk and cost.  Unlike other aircraft, 
sUAS are typically highly-limited by size, weight and 
cost and do not have human pilots onboard.  In 
addition, some sUAS applications involve operations 
in very close proximity to the general public, such as 
envisioned for package delivery.  Maintaining low-
weight and size greatly contributes to mitigating the 
risk from the vehicle.  However, in order to maintain 
low-weight, size, and cost, it is essential that sUAS 
leverage new and emerging micro technologies.  
The testing conducted herein involves test and 
evaluations of several essential sUAS prototype 
subsystems. Objectives of the current test include: 1) 
Determine the usability of Dedicated Short Range 
Communications (DSRC) systems developed for the 
automotive industry for potential sense and avoid 
sUAS applications; 2) Evaluate the use of cellular 4G 
control systems to provide vehicle control; 3) Obtain 
high-resolution video imagery in support of image-
based optical detection sense and avoid systems, and; 
4) Acquire data in fixed-wing flight to support 
validation and maturation of an autonomous range 
containment system known as Safeguard in fixed-wing 
flight  
While the UTM system will greatly mitigate the 
risk for mid-air collisions with manned aircraft by 
potentially establishing low-altitude sUAS operation 
areas, further mitigation is considered required since 
encounters with general aviation (GA) aircraft are still 
possible.  Several options exist for sUAS sense and 
avoid (SAA) and include both ground-based sensing 
and onboard systems.  Autonomous SAA for sUAS is 
considered critical to enable the vehicle to perform air 
traffic deconflictions. 
Ground-based SAA systems have an advantage in 
that the ground based radar (or other sensors) do not 
have to be carried by the vehicle and with the advent of 
low-cost ground-based radars, as described in 
Reference 2, could feasibly be installed to provide 
usable areas of operations.  A drawback of ground-
based systems is that the communication link to the 
sUAS has to be extremely reliable since any type of 
communication failure would directly lead to a loss of 
SAA functionality for the sUAS and a mid-air collision 
hazard.  The requirement for extremely reliable 
command and control (C2) links can lead to the C2 
system being excessively heavy and/or expensive 
leading to an unviable sUAS. 
Alternatively, onboard SAA systems allow some 
relief to the C2 requirement as the sUAS is able to both 
detect and then directly communicated with the 
autopilot to avoid airborne threats.  Cooperative 
onboard SAA systems are exemplified by current 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS-B) systems 
used in manned aircraft.  ADS-B systems continuously 
broadcast the vehicles’ location to other aircraft and to 
ground-based transceivers that route the data to Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) (Reference 3).  Aircraft 
equipped with both ADS-B in and out can also receive 
traffic information and use it to perform deconflictions.  
Currently, the ADS-B system is designed to handle 
envisioned commercial and GA traffic rates.  The 
estimated number of future sUAS operations is 
considered high-enough to threaten to overload the 
radio frequency (RF) component and the ground based 
transceivers of the ADS-B system as presented in 
Reference 4.  As such assuming ADS-B use (ADS-B 
out) for sUAS is not considered viable.  
Alternatives to using typical ADS-B units for 
sUAS include greatly-reduced transmit power ADS-B 
units or other communications devices also described 
in Reference 4.  It has been proposed to use DSRC 
systems as an alternative to ADS-B for sUAS.  DSRC 
systems have been developed for the automotive 
industry to provide safety data links to drivers to warn 
of other vehicles and operate in the 5.9 GHz frequency 
band as described in Reference 5.  It is envisioned that 
a DSRC-based sUAS SAA system could be used to 
deconflict sUAS from each other.  It is also envisioned 
that this information could be received by ground-
based stations and integrated with the FAA’s ADS-B 
system.  While some latency is possible with this 
concept, it could provide valuable awareness to 
manned aircraft pilots.  Objectives of the current effort 
were to determine the performance of DSRC systems 
to provide air-to-ground, ground-to-air, and air-to-air 
communication links installed in representative sUAS.  
For this test, representative DSRC equipment was 
installed in sUAS and operated over ranges up to 0.5 
miles (805 m) from the ground station.  Multiple sUAS 
were operated with DSRC equipment installed for air-
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to-air ranges from approximately 500 ft (152 m) up to 
1 mile (1.6 km). 
Command and control of sUAS is another critical 
challenge for BVLOS sUAS operations.  One method 
of C2 involves direct communication link with the 
vehicle from the ground station.  Typically this 
requires line of sight to the vehicle.  Mountains, 
buildings, and trees could limit line of sight operations.  
Also, the power required to transmit increases 
dramatically as the range to the vehicle increases.  
Another option is satellite-based command and control 
as described in Reference 6.  One challenge with this 
method is the size and power required to transmit data 
to/from satellites in orbit to sUAS.  Recent 
developments include satellites with very large receive 
antennas that can help to reduce the transmit power 
required from the sUAS as discussed in Reference 6.  
Yet another C2 option involves terrestrial-based 
distributed communications technologies, such as 4G 
cell technology.  A great advantage to this C2 method 
is the large amount of cellular infrastructure already in 
place as described in Reference 7.  One concern with 
4G cell C2 applications is that the system is designed 
to serve people on the ground with the cell tower 
beams aimed down slightly.  Another concern is the 
method by which the system switches from one cell 
tower to another and the overall power and coverage 
available.  In addition, local system overload is also 
possible is some urban environments.  Lastly, latency 
issues with 4G C2 is yet another issue since this link 
involves multiple separate systems between the 
operator and sUAS.  Reference 7 explores use of 4G 
C2 but focused only on the portion of the flight when 
the vehicle was at its’ cruising condition.  The current 
work endeavors to look at the entire sUAS operation 
including pre-flight, launch, climb, cruise, descent, 
landing, and post-flight recovery, in a rural 
environment. 
Another option for onboard non-cooperative SAA 
for sUAS involves the use of visual-based sensors to 
provide detection of non-cooperative targets.  Within 
this method high-resolution cameras provide video 
imagery to image-based object detection (IOD) 
algorithms.  These algorithms also receive aircraft state 
data from the autopilot and can search for and detect 
airborne objects as discussed in Reference 8.  Primary 
challenges for IOD algorithms are having enough 
pixels on the target for detection along with having 
adequate processing power available on the sUAS for 
effective tracking.  Recent manned aircraft studies as 
documented in Reference 9 were performed in support 
of several applications.  One potential application is for 
supersonic business jet aircraft, whose pilots may not 
have direct forward vision.  Another application is for 
large UAS.  A major challenge for IOD from sUAS 
applications are the extreme size, weight, power, 
constraints.  Given the very low-altitude operational 
environment for sUAS compared to manned aircraft, 
testing was performed herein to determine the effect of 
extreme background clutter for IOD algorithms as 
compared to results from Reference 9.  For this effort 
high-resolution cameras were affixed to sUAS and 
flown in the presence of another sUAS at ranges from 
approximately 500 ft (152 m) up to 1 mile (1.6 km). 
Highly-reliable autonomous systems are required 
for BVLOS operations.  SUAS feature many 
subsystems, such as navigation, control, batteries, 
sensors, C2, etc., which all will need to be highly-
reliable for the entire sUAS to be highly-reliable.  
However, if the vehicle could be ensured to stay within 
a specific boundary, or outside of specific boundaries, 
then potentially the other subsystems could be allowed 
to perform at a lower-level of reliability and still result 
in an acceptable overall level of risk for limited 
BLVOS operations.  Current geo-fencing, or geo-
limitation, systems are designed to detect and warn 
with sUAS are outside of specified areas.  For 
example, it is particularly useful to guard against 
inadvertent fly-aways caused by incorrect flight paths 
entered by the user or a lost link situation.  Typically, 
these geo-fencing functions are implemented as 
embedded functions within the autopilot system; this 
effectively makes their reliability only as good as the 
reliability of the entire auto-pilot. 
A system referred to as Safeguard was devised and 
developed with the intention of being independent of 
the auto-pilot and subject to rigorous software 
development and testing processes as described in 
References 10 and 11. The idea is to create a 
conformance monitor whose reliability can be much 
greater than the system it is monitoring.  Extensive 
previous testing of Safeguard prototypes was 
accomplished using multi-rotor (MR) vehicles with top 
speeds of approximately 20 mph (10 m/s).  It was 
desired to test Safeguard at higher flight speeds and on 
fixed-wing aircraft where aerodynamics are 
significantly different (e.g. when predicting ballistic 
trajectories).  Safeguard-specific objectives for this 
flight test were (a) to confirm that installation, 
operation, and procedures were feasible and practical 
for fixed-wing sUAS, and (b) to collect Safeguard 
performance data at representative speeds and 
maneuvers for fixed-wing sUAS.  Test data were 
acquired while operating at various speeds from 17 to 
25 m/s (38 to 56 mph) at constant altitudes. Testing on 
other platforms is ongoing concurrently, with results to 
be published separately. 
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Method 
To achieve all the objectives stated above a series 
of sUAS vehicles were modified to carry various 
components and then flown, either individually, or in 
pairs.  A total of six sUAS were used for this effort.  
Vehicles used included a 120” span commercial 
Tempest sUAS, a 6-rotor MR referred as the Tarot 
Hexacopter, and a 68” span Mig-27 scale foam aircraft 
referred as the Mig. 
Vehicles used 
UASUSA Tempest 
The Tempest UAS is an electrically-powered 
fixed-wing aircraft.  The Tempest is manufactured by 
the UASUSA Company.  It is launched via a rail and 
bungee cord system with an empty gross takeoff 
weight of 15 lbs. and belly-landed.  The Tempest can 
carry up to 10 lbs. of payload and fly for over an hour 
on a single 11 Ah 5-cell Lithium Polymer (LiPO) 
battery.  The baseline aircraft comes equipped with 
Pixhawk autopilot and long-range 900 MHz telemetry 
and 2.4 GHz radio control (R/C) links.  While the 
vehicle is capable of fully autonomous launches and 
landings, it was manually flown for launches and 
landings for the flight testing performed herein.  The 
Tempest was switched into autonomous mode (auto 
mode) when it was near the desired operating altitude 
and monitored by the safety pilot. 
A total of two Tempest aircraft were used for the 
current testing.  One Tempest (N533NU) was 
configured to carry the Safeguard geofencing system.  
Safeguard was self-contained, had its own battery 
power and only required a place to mount inside the 
vehicle.  While being designed to interface with the 
vehicle’s autopilot, the tests described here performed 
as a ride-along to acquire data at speeds and along 
flight paths more typical for fixed-wing sUAS. 
Additional details on the installation of Safeguard into 
N533NU are provided in a later section. 
The other Tempest (N534NU), shown in Figure 1, 
was configured to carry a Bendix-King KGX-150 
ADS-B unit, Botlink 4G cell and DSRC 
communication links in addition to the baseline 
equipage.  With the potential addition of cameras, it is 
considered that the Tempest represents a viable 
commercial UTM sUAS platform and could perform 
fire spotting or other surveillance BVLOS missions.  
For the current research flights, the ADS-B unit was 
not powered to mitigate any potential effect on the 
DSRC testing.  Further testing is anticipated to 
examine ADS-B effects on DSRC performance. 
Figure 2 illustrates the installation of Botlink XRD 
in the aft payload bay of the Tempest aircraft.  
Provisions to enable the Pixhawk to control power to 
the Botlink XRD in flight were implemented to protect 
against potential failure modes.  The antenna used for 
the Botlink was the Taoglass FXUB66.  The Taoglass 
antenna was selected due to its very small size and 
easy compact mounting as compared to the standard 
dipole antennas.   The antenna was mounted to the 
surface of the fuselage just aft of the wing as shown in 
Figure 3.  The radiation pattern for the antenna is at 
925 MHz is presented in Figure 4.  Note that the 
Botlink operational frequency was 1.08 GHz.  The “z” 
axis is aligned normal to the flat surface of the antenna 
and the “x” axis aligned with the longer dimension.   
To provide essential safety of flight position 
awareness for potential BVLOS flight operations, a 
Bendix-King KGX-150 was installed in the Tempest.  
The KGX-150 is shown in Figure 5.  It was installed in 
the forward payload bay and was powered by a 
dedicated 4cell 1,400 mah LiPO battery pack.  The 
KGX-150 transmitted aircraft position on 978 MHz 
frequency at 40 Watts of power.  A unity gain antenna 
was mounted in the canopy.  Provisions were provided 
for the Pixhawk to control the power to the KGX-150 
and be able to turn it on and off in flight to mitigate 
initial concerns regarding interference with other 
avionics.  Testing indicated acceptable operations and 
at no time was there a need to shut-down the system in 
flight. 
The OBU-201 DSRC unit was installed in the 
forward payload bay of the Tempest directly above the 
KGX-150 ADS-B as shown in Figure 6.  Similar to the 
Botlink installation, a Taoglass MAXIMUS FXUB66 
antenna was used shown in Figure 7. The radiation 
pattern of the antenna at 5.9 GHz is presented in Figure 
8.  Note in Figure 8 that the radiation pattern indicates 
some non-uniformity but does provide approximately 4 
dB normal to the surface.   
 
Figure 1 - Tempest-2 (N534NU) in flight. 
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Figure 2 - Photograph of Botlink XRD device in the Tempest 
aft payload bay. 
 
Figure 3 – Tempest fuselage illustrating installation of 
antennas for the Botlink (aft) and Unex OBU-201 (forward). 
 
Figure 4 - Radiation pattern for FXUB66 Taoglass antenna 
at 925 MHz used for the Botlink. 
 
Figure 5 - Bendix King KGX-150 ADS-B unit. 
 
Figure 6 - Installation of the Unex OBU-201 in the Tempest. 
 
Figure 7 - OBU-201 patch antenna. 
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Figure 8 - Taoglass FXUB-66 antenna 5.9 GHz radiation 
pattern. 
Tarot Hexacopter 
The Tarot hexacopter MR has a rotor span of 40” 
and weighed approximately 15 lbs. in its research 
configuration.  The Tarot used a 6 cell 16 Ah LiPO 
battery with a maximum flight time of approximately 
16 minutes with 30% battery reserve.  A 900 MHz 
telemetry link was used to control the vehicle from the 
GCS.  In addition, the Tarot’s also included R/C 
control via 2.4 GHz Spektrum system.  Two Tarots 
were used for this effort.  Both were equipped with 
Unex OBU-201 DSRC devices carried below the main 
body of the vehicle.  A photograph of Tarot-1 is 
provided in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Tarot Multi Rotor hexacopter.  
Mig 
The Mig vehicles are scale models of Russian 
Mig-27 ground attack aircraft.  They were originally 
designed to serve as target practice vehicles for the US 
Army and are primarily constructed from foam.  They 
were given to NASA and used for general testing 
purposes.  The Mig’s are general purpose vehicles and 
can carry approximately 5 lbs. of payload and fly for 
15 minutes.  They are electrically-powered 
conventional aircraft that takeoff and land under 
manual R/C pilot control. They were equipped with 
Pixhawk autopilots and could perform autonomous 
flight maneuvers.   
Two Migs were used for the testing conducted 
herein.  One was primarily a pilot proficiency trainer 
aircraft and referred to as Mig-CC.  The other Mig, 
referred to as Mig-LH, was configured to carry 
cameras on the wing tips for IOD testing as well as 
carry an OBU-201 DSRC unit underneath the fuselage.  
A photograph of Mig-LH is presented in Figure 10.  
The installation of the OBU-201 DSRC unit onto Mig-
LH is provided in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10 - Mig-LH. 
 
Figure 11 - Mig-LH fuselage with OBU-201 unit installed. 
 
DSRC equipment 
The Unex OBU-201 DSRC system was selected 
as a representative DSRC systems and used for testing.  
The OBU-201 basic system is shown in Figure 12.  It 
was selected for testing as it was packaged in a robust 
enclosure that fit well into an array of sUAS platforms, 
user interface software was easy to use with good 
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customer support, and it met the DSRC requirements 
for frequency and power. 
The transmission power for the OBU-201 system 
was measured to be 26 dB at a frequency of 5.86 GHz.  
The DSRC units were programed to transmit at 2 Hz 
when a 3D fix was determined at a data rate of 12 
Mb/sec.   Implementation testing revealed that the 
actual packet transmission rate was approximately 1.5 
packets/sec.  Only aerial packets are included in the 
airborne DSRC packet transmission analysis, i.e. both 
vehicles are airborne for flight test results. Ground 
testing evaluated packet transmission with the test 
vehicles stationary.  Packet content includes: Call Sign, 
Latitude, Longitude, Altitude, Heading, Horizontal 
Velocity, Vertical Velocity, GPS HDOP, GPS 
Satellites in view, and GPS Satellites used in 3D fix 
calculation. 
Four transmission paths were evaluated for testing 
documented herein: Ground to Ground, Vehicle to 
Ground, Ground to Vehicle, and Vehicle to Vehicle.  
Each transmitted packet was checked for successful 
reception by the other DSRC boxes.   The transmitted 
packet timestamp was used to lookup GPS coordinates 
of the other DSRC boxes during a post-processing 
calculation of separation distance between the DSRC 
boxes using the Spherical Law of Cosines coordinates 
as shown in the formula below where d is the 
computed distance between the two GPS coordinates,  
𝜑𝜑1 is the Latitude for vehicle 1, 𝜑𝜑2 is the Latitude for 
vehicle 2, 𝜆𝜆 is the difference between Longitude 1 and 
2, and R is the Earth’s Radius of 6,371 kilometers.  
Note that the d is ground distance and does not 
consider changes in elevation for distance calculations:   
 
𝑑𝑑 = cos−1(sin𝜑𝜑1 ∗ sin𝜑𝜑2 +cos𝜑𝜑1 ∗ cos𝜑𝜑2 ∗ cos 𝜆𝜆)
∗ 𝑅𝑅 
 
 
Figure 12 - Unex OBU-201 DSRC device with standard 
dipole antennas. 
4G Cell Link 
One objective of this flight test effort was to 
characterize the performance of 4G cell link systems to 
provide command and control of sUAS.  To meet this 
objective a Botlink XRD unit was installed in the 
Tempest aircraft and configured to record cell link 
characteristic data at 1 HZ. 
The 4G Botlink system is designed to be a 
communication link for sUAS.  It includes an internet-
connected tablet device with user interface and 4G 
transceiver onboard the aircraft that is connected to the 
Pixhawk autopilot.  Data regarding the 4G cell link is 
recorded onboard an SD card internal to the Botlink 
device on the vehicle.  Parameters recorded included: 
Reference Signal Received Power (RSRP), Reference 
Signal Received Quality (RSRQ), Tower ID for both 
the connected and neighboring towers, vehicle GPS 
latitude, longitude, and altitude, along with other 
parameters that describe the quality of the cell link. 
Cell link data were analyzed from approximately 60 
seconds prior to launch to 60 seconds after landing. 
A cell phone tower database was acquired with 
support from a wireless carrier.  The general 
characteristics of the database are presented in Table 1 
which presents the total number of cell phone towers in 
the database, the distance to the closest cell phone 
tower to the Beaver Dam test site, the distance to the 
tower furthest away, the average distance, and the 
standard deviation of the distance to the cell phone 
towers.  Note that each cell phone tower generally 
includes three sectors with sector 1 aligned to the 
North, sector 2 to the South East and Sector 3 to the 
South West.  Results are presented only for what 
specific tower was being communicated with and not 
which sector.  In general, the cell coverage at Beaver 
Dam for surface use is considered to be commensurate 
with rural areas with very poor service based on users’ 
experience at that facility. 
 
 
Table 1 - Characteristics of cell phone tower database. 
Total number of towers 16 
Minimum range 5.2 miles 
Maximum range 17.4 miles 
Average range 11.5 miles 
Standard deviation 4.2 miles 
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Image Object Detection 
Provisions were made to also carry a high-
resolution Sony Action Cam camera with narrow field 
of view lens on the Mig and Tarot vehicles.  An image 
of the Sony Action Cam is provided in Figure 13.  The 
Sony Action Cam camera featured a sensor resolution 
of 3840 horizontal by 2160 vertical pixels.  To achieve 
very-high resolution imagery, a 41-deg horizontal field 
of view (FOV) lens.  This combination produced a 
93.7 pixel per degree (ppd) resolution.  It should be 
noted that nominal 20/20 human visual acuity is 
defined as 60 ppd.  Selecting a narrow FOV lens 
enhanced the number of pixels that could be put onto a 
target.  More pixels on target enhances the ability for 
IOD algorithms to detect and track targets. 
The work described here is an extension of the 
work previously published in Reference 8 with a 
revised 4k camera configuration from the stock fish-
eye 170 degree FOV lens.  This new lens configuration 
dramatically increased the number of pixels on the 
intruder aircraft that only yielded limited detection 
results above the horizon using an optical flow based 
algorithm.  The motivation for this revision is to 
provide more image features on target for optical based 
detection and classification at greater separation 
distances and against more cluttered backgrounds (e.g. 
trees) that exist below the horizon.  The same method 
from Reference 8 is currently being applied to achieve 
a baseline result and is presented in the Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 13 - Sony action cam. 
 
Figure 14: Optical flow based sUAS detector 
 
Safeguard 
The Safeguard system was designed to operate on 
any sUAS to provide highly-assured vehicle 
containment within, or exclusive of, specified areas as 
described in References 11 and 12.  It was also 
designed to operate as an independent “black box”, 
such that it could be readily installed and integrated 
into off-the-shelf aircraft. While the system has been 
evaluated extensively on MR sUAS at speeds and 
maneuvers commensurate to those vehicles and the 
missions they fly; it had yet to be installed, integrated, 
or tested on a fixed-wing sUAS like the Tempest.  In 
addition to stressing the fit check to a tight SWAP 
conformance limit, the Tempest fixed-wing sUAS 
provided the ability to operate at twice the speeds of 
the MR sUAS, and for extended periods of time. 
As shown in Figure 15, the Tempest-1 aircraft was 
configured to carry the prototype Safeguard unit. This 
required removing the outer case, repackaging into a 
smaller case, and moving the external connectors to be 
accessible for pre-loading and off-loading data. 
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Figure 15 – Safeguard installation in Tempest-1 aircraft. 
In addition to the flight component of Safeguard, 
there is a user interface hosted on a laptop at the GCS. 
Although there is no connection to the unit during 
flight, this interface enables configuration (prior to 
flight) and data off-loading (post-flight) via a standard 
wired Ethernet connection. 
Figure 16 is a screenshot of the graphical user 
interface from the version used during the testing. 
Several capabilities are implemented here, primarily to 
support developmental tests and software verification 
and validation. Operationally, the procedure for 
configuring the unit is straight-forward, taking only 2-
3 minutes. 
(1) Establish Ethernet connection 
(2) Check error log from previous flight 
(3) Perform system reset 
(4) Load stay-in boundary 
(5) Load stay-out boundary(s) (if any) 
(6) Set/check mode (nav sys 1, nav sys 1+2) 
(7) Set/check buffer scale factors 
(8) Set/check aero coefficients 
(9) Perform altitude initialization (Alt Init) 
(10)  If “all green”, then “operational” 
(11) Unplug connector, ready to fly 
10
  
Figure 56: Safeguard user interface (developed by NASA 
Langley’s Flight Software Systems Branch) 
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Ground testing and preparations 
All vehicles were developed following a phased 
integrate test fly approach.  This method allowed 
insight into vehicle integration for the various 
components to be understood one at a time.  This 
method alleviates a situation where all systems are 
integrated at one time and evaluated all at once which 
can lead to significant delays due to a lack of 
understanding of the integration effects of one 
subsystem on another.  It also allows more time 
operating the subsystems integrated into the vehicle 
earlier to build confidence in their operation and 
results and experience operating the systems.    
Part of the ground testing performed involved 
ground range tests of the DSRC equipment.  For this 
test the flight vehicles were assembled and all 
subsystems powered-up.  However, no power was 
provided for the electric motors.  This replicated to a 
large extent the electromagnetic environment on the 
vehicle in flight.  A road segment was identified on 
NASA LaRC that was approximately 0.7 miles long 
and nearly completely straight and level.  The vehicles 
were located at one end of the road and placed upon 
vehicle setup stands or plastic tables.  Another DSRC 
box was located in a simple cardboard box with 
antennas and battery power and held by an operator.   
This DSRC box was referred to as the Mobile Unex 
box. The operator would then walk to the far end of the 
road and back again.   
For the ground testing the Tempest vehicle was 
oriented pointing roughly North with the test range 
oriented in a Westerly direction.  The Tarot was 
oriented in a Westerly direction with a clear view of 
both omni antennas to the Mobile Unex box.  The Mig 
aircraft was tested in two orientations (North and West 
(Offset orientation)).  
Flight test operations 
For multi-vehicle operations, both aircraft were 
preflighted simultaneously by separate flight teams.    
Each vehicle flight team included a pilot, visual 
observer, and GCS operator (GCSO).  In addition to 
each flight team, a range safety officer (RSO) was 
present to observe the flight operations. Once both 
aircraft were ready for flight they were moved to their 
specific launch locations. 
The Tempest aircraft was referred to as the 
“target” aircraft and Mig and Tarot were considered to 
be “ownship” aircraft.  All the ownship aircraft flew 
the Beaver Dam East route illustrated in Figure 17 at 
an altitude of 200 m (613 ft) AGL. The Tempest 
always flew the Beaver Dam West route illustrated in 
Figure 17 at altitudes of 170, 200, or 230 m (558, 613, 
745 ft) AGL depending on the desired data to be 
acquired. 
Conducting operations in this manner produced 
the following desired test attributes: 1) Produced a 
range of separation distances between the target and 
ownship aircraft from approximately 500 ft (152 m) up 
to 1 mile (1.6 km), 2) Produced a range of visual cross 
sections for the target vehicle across a range of 
separation distances, 3) Provided at, above, and below 
the horizon encounters and a range of altitudes for the 
IOD, and 4) Created a range of altitudes for the 4G cell 
link evaluation.  
A run log of all the flights completed in support of 
this project are provided in Appendix A. 
Tempest operations 
For all multi-vehicle operations the Tempest was 
rail-launched first to leverage its longer endurance 
capabilities compared to the other aircraft.  Once the 
vehicle was airborne it was manually flown to an 
altitude close to the desired target altitude and speed 
and aligned with the desired flight path then 
transitioned into auto mode.  The Tempest would 
perform counter-clockwise flight paths maintaining 
constant airspeed and altitude.   The airspeed used for 
most of the Tempest operations was 19 m/s (42.5 mph) 
which is approximately its maximum endurance speed.  
Safeguard operations included a range of speeds from 
18 m/s to 25 m/s (40 to 58 mph).  Once the Tempest 
was established in auto mode, the other vehicle was 
launched.  After the other vehicle was landed and 
moved off the runway, the Tempest pilot would select 
manual flight mode and manually land the aircraft.  In 
general, the Tempest flight times were approximately 
25 minutes in duration. 
Mig operations 
The Mig was ground-launched and manually 
flown by the pilot.  Altitude was limited to be 
approximately 300 ft (91 m) or less until the Mig was 
within its designated airspace east of the No Fly Zone 
shown in Figure 17.  Once within its airspace, the 
aircraft was flown to its approximate target altitude 
and airspeed and aligned with the intended flight path.  
At that time, it was transitioned into auto mode and it 
would then execute clockwise flight paths.  Altitude 
and airspeed were maintained during auto mode.  The 
Mig was commanded to fly at 18 m/s (40.3 mph) 
which approximates its maximum endurance speed.  
When the flight time limit was reached, the Mig pilot 
would select manual flight mode and manually land 
the aircraft.  At least a 30% battery reserve was 
maintained at all times. 
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Tarot operations 
For flight operations with other aircraft the Tarot’s 
flight plan included a region of interest (ROI) that 
would keep the vehicle aimed at a point in the distance 
that would keep it pointing in the general direction of 
the target aircraft.  The Tarot was launched in manual 
mode then transitioned into auto mode.  Once in auto 
mode the Tarot would maintain constant ground speed 
and altitude while maintaining orientation with the 
ROI.  Ground speed used for the Tarot operations was 
10 m/s (22.4 mph).  Once the flight time limit was 
reached the pilot would either select return to launch 
(RTL) mode and the vehicle would autonomously fly 
to the point where the vehicle was powered-up and 
land itself. 
 
Figure 17 - Overview of routes flown. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Results are presented in the next 4 subsections for 
DSRC performance testing, 4G Botlink 
characterization, IOD discussion and some initial 
results and Safeguard evaluation results and 
discussion. 
DSRC system testing 
Results for DSRC V2V testing are provided in this 
section.  Ground test results are presented first 
followed by flight test results. 
DSRC ground testing 
Initial ground range test results performed in 
November, 2017 are provided in Figure 18.  The 
objective of the ground testing was to verify nominal 
performance before initiating flight operations.  In 
Figure 18 the percent of packets transmitted from one 
DSRC device and received by another are presented 
along with the distance between the two devices. 
From Figure 18 it can be seen that for separation 
distances less than 200 meters nearly 100% of the 
packets transmitted from the Mobile Unex box to the 
Tempest (N534) were received.  Similarly, the packets 
transmitted from the Tempest to the Mobile Unex box 
were also received.  As the separation range increased 
beyond 300 m the percent packets received began to 
decrease and reached 50% at approximately 600 
meters.  As range increased the percent of packets 
transmitted to or received by the Tempest (N534) 
reached zero by approximately 700 m.   
Similar to the Tempest results, the Mig in the 
offset orientation (i.e. aligned with the test track) also 
received nearly 100% of the packets received at ranges 
less than 300 m.   Packets transmitted from the Mig in 
the offset orientation were also received by the Mobile 
Unex box up to 300 m.  As range increased beyond 
300 m the percent of packets received decreased, 
similar to the Tempest, reaching 50% around 500 m 
and zero percent by 700 m. 
Results for the Mig in the North orientation were 
substantially different than the Tempest and Mig in the 
offset orientation.  For this test condition, the percent 
packets transmitted and/or received started out at only 
approximately 65% at close range and remained 
constant out to approximately 500 m.  Beyond that 
range the percent packets transmitted and/or received 
dropped off also reaching near zero percent at 700 m. 
The results for the Tarot transmitting to/from the 
Mobile Unex box were different from the other results.  
For ranges less than 300 m, the percent of packets 
received from the Tarot to the Mobile Unex box was 
approximately 95% up to 300 m range.  Instead of 
dropping off as the results for the Tempest and Mig in 
the offset orientation, the percent of packets received 
from the Tarot to the Mobile Unex box remained much 
higher and was never less than 50% over the ranges 
tested out to 1.1 km.  The percent of packets received 
by the Tarot from the Mobile Unex box were never 
above 50% but decreased at a rate similar to the results 
for the percent packets received by the Mobile Unex 
box from the Tarot. 
It appears that the results for the Tempest, both for 
transmission and reception of packets, indicate 
somewhat consistent distributions with both 
transmission paths being similar to each other.  Results 
for the Mig in the offset orientation (aligned with the 
test track) were similar to the Tempest.  However, 
results for the Mig in the North heading orientation 
were very different.  It is hypothesized that the 
presence of a carbon reinforcement strip located just 
beneath the Taoglass antenna confounded the DSRC 
installation and blocked emissions normal to the 
surface of the antenna.  This blockage would have 
degraded transmission and reception in the direction of 
the test track and Mobile Unex box when the Mig was 
oriented in the North direction.  This blockage was 
largely avoided for the offset (West) orientation.    
Results for the Tarot were unexpected and somewhat 
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unexplained.  It is hypothesized that as a result of the 
Tarot being positioned approximately 2 ft off the 
ground, compared to 3 or 4 ft off the ground for the 
Mig and Tempest, that some type of ground 
interference or multi-path phenomena could have 
confounded the results. 
The primary observations from the ground testing 
is that the percentage of packets transmitted between 
Unex DSRC boxes is nearly 100% for ranges below 
300 m and decreases rapidly and range increases 
reaching 50% transmission at 500 m.  Very low 
percentages of packets were received for ranges greater 
than 700 m in general. 
DSRC Flight Testing 
Figure 19 presents the distribution of data packets 
transmitted for all flights combined for ground-to-air, 
air-to-ground, and air-to-air.  Range of test conditions 
achieved varied from as close as 100 m (328 ft) for air 
to ground and ground to air transmission paths and up 
to approximately 0.9 km (2,953 ft).  Air to air 
transmission paths were evaluated from as low as 200 
m (656 ft) up to 1.6 km (5,250 ft).  Figure 19 is 
presented to provide some insight for the subsequent 
data analyses that involve the percentage of packets 
received.  For the ground-to-Tempest and Tempest-to-
ground the total number of data packets transmitted 
was approximately 800 to 900 for ranges from 0.3 out 
to 0.9 km.  A somewhat lower number of packets were 
transmitted for the Mig to/from the ground since that 
vehicle had shorter flights and fewer flights than the 
Tempest.  An even lower number of packets were 
acquired for the Tarot.  Note that the max range of the 
Tempest to the ground station was slightly larger than 
for the Mig or Tarot due to the flight plans selected.  
The difference in the number of packets transmitted 
from the air-to-ground and ground-to-air is likely due 
to the requirement that the DSRC systems need to have 
a GPS fix in order to transmit a position packet and 
that vehicle maneuvering can sometimes confound 
GPS reception.  From Figure 19 it can also be seen that 
between 2 and 100 data packets were transmitted for 
the air-to-air data analysis for ranges approximately 
from 0.2 to 1.6 km.   The very low number of packets 
transmitted for ranges less than 200 m was due to the 
presence of the 152 m (500 ft) wide no-fly zone.  
Figure 20 presents the percentage of packets 
received results.  Flight test results for multiple flights 
were combined to provide the results presented in 
Figure 20.  From Figure 20 it can be seen that the 
percentage of packets received by the Tempest from 
the GCS was approximately 80% at 100 m, 50% at 200 
m, and reaches 55% at 300 m then decreases to 
approximately 20% at 900 m.  The percentage of 
packets transmitted from the Tempest to the GCS is 
approximately 90% then decreases to 50% at 
approximately 600 m then decreases to 20% around 
800 m.  There is a slight increase in the percentage of 
packets received by the GCS from the Tempest at 900 
m. 
The percentage of packets received by the Tarot is 
approximately 90% at 100 m and decreases to 50% at 
500 m then decreases to 30% at 600 m.  The 
percentage of packets received by the GCS from the 
Tarot was approximately 90% at 100 m then decreased 
to approximately 70% at 500 m and then increased to 
85% at 600 m. 
The percentage of packets received from the GCS 
to the Mig was approximately 70% at 100 m and 
decreased to 50% by 200 m.  By 600 m the percentage 
of packets received from the GCS to the Mig was 
almost zero but did increase to 30% at 800 m.  Results 
for the Mig to the GCS were very similar to those for 
the GCS to the Mig. 
Air to air results indicate that the percentage of 
packets received by the Tarot from the Tempest was 
approximately 50% at 200 m, increased to 
approximately 55% at 300 m, then decreased to 10% 
by 600 m and eventually became zero but not until 
approximately 1.1 km. 
Results for the percentage of packets received by 
the Mig from the Tempest was 100% at 200m and then 
decreased quickly to zero at 400 m.  At 500 m the 
percentage of packets received by the Tempest from 
the Mig increased to 10% at 500 m, then became zero 
again by 800 m. Results for the percentage of packets 
received by the Tempest from the Mig were similar to 
the Mig to the Tempest. 
The percentage of packets received by the 
Tempest from the Tarot was approximately 75% at 200 
m, then decreased to 50% at approximately 400 m.  
The percentage of packets received by the Tempest 
from the Tarot then decreased to 20% at 600 m, 
increased to 30% at 800 m them decreased to zero at 
1.1 km.  If more than 50% of the packets transmitted 
need to be received for effective air traffic 
deconfliction, then the effective range becomes more 
like 400 m.  This amount of range may be inadequate 
for vehicles approaching each other at speeds greater 
than 10 m/s assuming a 30 second warning time. 
Overall observations from the DSRC flight testing 
results are that air-to-ground performance is similar to 
ground-to-air for the same vehicle for a range of 
distances.  The exception to this is for the Tarot with 
much better air-to-ground performance than ground-to-
air as shown in Figure 20.  At the maximum range, air 
to ground and ground to air reception performance was 
approximately equivalent for the Tempest and Mig. 
The best air-to-air performance was observed for the 
Tarot to the Tempest with more than 50% of the 
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packets received for ranges up to 400 m.  This could be 
due to the combination of antennas involved with this 
particular transmission path (i.e. dipole to patch).  
Packet transmission to/from the Mig to the Tempest 
and/or vice versa was much less than the performance 
to/from the Tarot to Tempest potentially due to the 
presence of the carbon strip in the Mig that could have 
degraded antenna performance for that vehicle. 
Comparisons of ground-to-ground performance to 
ground-to-air, air-to-ground, and air-to-air provide 
further insight into the DSRC performance.  
Comparing Figures 18 and 20 reveal that ground-to-
ground packet transmission performance was superior 
compared to air-to-ground, ground-to-air, or air-to-air 
for ranges less than approximately 600 m in general.  
However, for ranges greater than 600 m, air-to-ground, 
ground-to-air, and air-to-air were somewhat better for 
the Tempest and Tarot with maximum transmission 
ranges up to 1.1 km vs 0.7 km for ground to ground. 
It is hypothesized that the difference in the 
ground-to-ground vs the air-to-ground, ground-to-air 
and air-to-air results may be explained by the 
differences in test methods.  For the ground-to-ground 
testing, the Mobile Unex box was oriented with the 
normal to the surface of the Taoglass antenna aimed at 
the test aircraft.  For the Tempest ground to ground 
testing, the same orientation was used producing a 
highly advantageous antenna alignment as suggested in 
Figure 8.  Stated another way, the “z” vectors of the 
Taoglass antennas were aimed at each other for the 
Mobile Unex box and Tempest aircraft.  For flight 
testing, the orientation of the antennas was variable 
and based on the direction the vehicle was pointing.  It 
also needs to be noted that the method of flight testing 
can incur some artifacts due to the flight paths 
selected.     
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Figure 18 - Results for ground range testing of DSRC V2V equipment. 
Figure 19 - Distribution of data points for DSRC V2V flight testing. 
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Figure 20 - Results from flight testing of DSRC V2V equipment.
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Botlink 4G flight testing 
Results for the Botlink 4G flight testing are 
provided in this section.  
Figure 21 presents the total time where the 
Tempest was not connected to any cell tower along 
with the time where there was no cell tower 
identification (CID) in the recorded data.  It is 
considered that both conditions (no connected cell 
tower and no CID) were indicative of a no-link 
condition.  It can be seen from Figure 21 that the 
amount of time of no cell link varied from a maximum 
of 100 seconds for Flight 39 down to zero seconds for 
Flight 53.  It is hypothesized that the method of vehicle 
preflight was partially responsible for some of the 
variation in the results.  For Flight 53 the Tempest was 
moved directly from its assembly stand, where it was 
positioned approximately 3 ft above the ground, to the 
launcher rail, where it was approximately 1 ft off the 
ground and then launched.  The other flights involved 
placing the Tempest directly on the ground for more 
than a minute prior to launch.  In addition, the large 
amount of no link for Flight 39 is likely due to an 
extended amount of manual maneuvering for that flight 
with almost no time in auto mode. 
Figure 22 presents the total number of cell phone 
towers connected to the Tempest for each flight.  It can 
be seen from Figure 22 that the Tempest was 
connected to an average of approximately 2 or 3 
towers.  The highest number of connected cell towers 
were for Flight 48 with a mean of more than 3 with 
only approximately 20% of the time connected to less 
than 2 towers.  Note that flight 48 was flown at the 
highest cruising altitude of 230 m (755 ft).  Lowest 
number of connected towers was for Flight 49 with an 
average closer to 2 towers that was flown with the 
lowest cruising altitude of 170 m (556 ft).   
Figure 23 presents the mean distance from the 
Tempest to the primary connected cell phone tower.  
From Figure 23 it can be seen that the mean distance 
was approximately 5.5 miles for most flights indicating 
that the Tempest was communicating with the closest 
available tower (refer to Table 1 for the cell tower data 
base).  The standard deviation bars in Figure 23 
indicate the variation of cell phone towers connected to 
for each flight.  The largest variation was for Flight 39 
which had a large amount of manual maneuvering and 
almost no auto mode.  Flight 49 had the least variation 
in distance with much of that due to the distance 
covered by the vehicle in flight.  The maximum 
distance to the connected cell tower recorded for all 
flights herein was 16.4 miles observed for Flight 39. 
Figure 24 presents mean RSRP for all flights.  
Reference 12 indicates that good to excellent RSRP 
values are greater than -105 dBm.  Poor RSRP is 
considered to be less than -120 dBm.  Figure 24 
indicates that RSRP in the good to strong range.  
Figure 25 presents real-time RSRP as a function of 
altitude for Flight 53.  It can be seen from Flight 53 
that RSRP was in the poor range at low altitudes when 
the vehicle is being prepared for flight.  RSRP 
increases until the Tempest reached approximately 100 
ft (30 m) altitude then was fairly constant throughout 
the flight.  The majority of the flight in auto mode 
occurred at approximately 550 ft (168 m) as indicated 
by the large cluster of data points at that altitude. 
Mean reference signal received quality is 
presented in Figure 26.  Reference 12 indicates that 
good to excellent RSRQ exist for values greater than -
15 dBm.  Fair to poor RSRQ values exists for RSRQ 
ranges less than -15 dBm.  Figure 26 reveals that mean 
RSRQ was predominantly below the fair to poor range 
for all flights.  However, many flights had good to 
strong values for RSRQ for at least part of time as 
indicated by the standard deviation bars in Figure 26.  
Figure 27 presents real-time RSRQ as a function of 
altitude for Flight 53.  Unlike RSRP, RSRQ does not 
appear to be a function of altitude.  The best results for 
RSRQ appear to be during the mid-altitudes where the 
vehicle was climbing to or descending from cruise 
altitude. 
Overall, results for the 4G cell link indicate a 
potentially usable system for command and control.  
Results for distance to the connected tower appear to 
indicate that the directionality of the Taoglass antenna 
may cause some issues that might be resolved with a 
more omnidirectional antenna.  This is supported by 
the larger variation for Flight 39 which included a 
large amount of manually-controlled vehicle 
maneuvering.  It was somewhat surprising that the data 
indicates that the maximum range to a connected tower 
was greater than 16 miles.  However, in general, the 
Botlink 4G system was connected to the closest tower 
which was 5.2 miles away with good to strong RSRP.  
In addition, the system was also connected to more 
than 2 cell towers most of the time which provides 
some level of redundancy and enhances the potential 
use of this method of C2 for sUAS.  It is considered 
that a higher number of connected towers (i.e.; 3 or 4) 
may be required for adequate C2.  Another observation 
was that in areas with very poor cell coverage, such as 
those tested in a rural environment, reliable 
communications with the vehicle in close proximity to 
the ground may not be possible.  It needs to be 
recognized that much of a sUAS operations occurs on 
the ground during preflight, launch and recovery 
operations.  The required performance for 
communication links based on phase of flight need to 
be established. 
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Figure 21- Total time with no link and time with no cell ID 
for flights. 
 
Figure 22 - Number of connected towers for all flights. Error 
bars are one standard deviation. 
 
Figure 23- Mean distance to the primary connected tower to 
the Tempest aircraft for all flights Error bars are one 
standard deviation. 
 
Figure 24 - Mean Reference Signal Received Power for all 
flights. Error bars are one standard deviation. 
 
Figure 25- Real time RSRP vs altitude for Flight 53. 
 
Figure 26 - Mean Received Signal Reference Quality for all 
flights.  Error bars indicate are one standard deviation. 
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Figure 27- Real-time RSRQ vs altitude for Flight 
IOD discussion and initial results 
Image-based Object Detection results are provided 
in this section.  High-resolution position-correlated 
video were acquired for a range of separation distances 
from 500 ft (152 m) out to approximately 1 mile (1.6 
km).   
Preliminary results indicate improved detection at 
greater ranges for above-the-horizon detection as 
shown in Figures 28 through 30 compared to previous 
results with lower ppd systems as presented in 
Reference 8.  Figure 28 shows positive detection of the 
Tempest at approximately 780 m (2,559 ft) heading 
towards the Tarot Hexacopter.  Figure 29 shows the 
Tempest performing a high-profile maneuver with 
positive detection.  Finally, figure 30 shows the 
Tempest aircraft with a tangential heading to the 
Hexacopter with three false positives at a range of 260 
m (853 ft).    
Future IOD work include:      
1. Synchronizing video data and flight logs from
flight controllers for the entire dataset so that
information regarding the pose, separation
distance, cross-sectional area exposed to the
camera, and velocity may be used to interpret
the IOD results.
2. The implementation of a Kalman filter to
further suppress false positives for the optical-
flow method.
3. The implementation of IOD algorithms used
in Reference 9 used for manned aircraft
testing.
4. Design of baseline IOD system for sUAS to
include: camera(s), lens, algorithm, and
computer system.
5. The implementation of Convolution Neural
Network for potential intruder classification.
Figure 28: The Tempest (the intruder sUAS) is detected in 
the middle of the image.   
Figure 29: An example of a detection without false positives. 
Figure 30: A typical frame with positive detection with 3 
false positives.     
Safeguard 
Two flights were completed using the Tempest-1 
with Safeguard installed and operational. Flight paths 
are shown in Figures 30 and 31, with the geo-fence 
stay-in test case boundary overlaid, as well as the state 
(outside or inside) as determined by Safeguard during 
the flights. For these tests, only a stay-in boundary was 
used. Further, a relatively small area was defined with 
a complex irregular shape. This allowed the testing of 
many boundary crossings at many different approach 
angles and speeds, as well as climbing and descending. 
As shown in the figures, for both flights, 
Safeguard correctly identified each point as inside or 
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outside the boundary. For Tempest-1 Flight 27, this 
corresponded to 2468 total measurements and 1410 in-
flight measurements (23.5 minutes). For Tempest-1 
Flight 28, this corresponded to 2233 total 
measurements and 1370 in-flight measurements (22.8 
minutes). As indicated in the zoomed-in portions of 
Figure 30 (a-d), measurements near the boundaries 
were also correctly identified. For Flight 27 the 
minimum distance-to-boundary was 0.15 m. The 
variance in measure-to-measure distances is due to 
differences in vehicle velocity as expected, given a 1 
Hz update rate. The clustering of points, such as shown 
in Figure 30 (d), is due to the overlay of multiple laps 
flown by the vehicle once reaching the flight path 
altitude of 200 m (656 ft). During these flights, speed 
ranged from 0 to 32.6 m/sec (0 to 73 mph). 
A higher-level function within Safeguard predicts 
boundary violations such that the pilot (or auto-pilot) 
can be warned in time to make a contingency 
maneuver that avoids breaching a fence. Safeguard has 
the ability to signal when flight termination may be 
necessary to keep the vehicle from leaving a fenced 
area for a case where violation is eminent and the pilot 
or auto-pilot has not intervened appropriately. Both the 
warning and termination signals are issued based on 
Safeguard configuration settings established prior to 
flight by the operator. These include buffer sizes, scale 
factors, and/or aircraft aerodynamic model 
coefficients. 
For the two test flights with the Tempest, these 
were all set very conservatively and the test boundary 
was defined as a relatively small region given the flight 
performance capability of the Tempest. This resulted 
in only small segments of time where predictive 
warnings were generated. One example is shown in 
Figure 32 for Flight 27. Here, as the vehicle 
approaches a boundary, the warning signal becomes 
active first (blue ‘+’ symbol), then the terminate signal 
becomes active (red ‘*’ symbol). For this version, 
terminate is defined as points wherein the vehicle is 
predicted to cross a boundary even if all power is cut 
from the motors (i.e. the ballistic trajectory will take 
the vehicle beyond the boundary). In the example 
shown, the vehicle is slowing and descending (to land), 
so warnings and terminate signal transitions can be 
seen. These transitions would not be seen during the 
higher altitude high-speed flying as the stay-in region 
defined was too small to test these transitions. 
All of this data helps to validate the formally-
verified function within Safeguard that determines 
inside/outside for any point with a high-degree of 
assurance (i.e. very low probability of missed-
detection and false alarm) as described in Reference 
13.
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Figure 30. Safeguard test results (Flight 27) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Safeguard test results (Flight 28) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Sample predictive warning case (Fight 
27). 
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Conclusions  
A series of ground and flight tests were completed 
to address the potential use of Dedicated Short Range 
Communications (DSRC) systems for potential sense 
and avoid small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) 
applications, evaluation of the use of cellular 4G 
systems to provide vehicle control, to obtain high-
resolution video imagery in support of image-based 
optical detection sense and avoid systems, and 
acquisition of data in support of development of an 
autonomous range containment system. 
The following conclusions can be made regarding 
the results presented.  One conclusion is that the 
effective range of the DSRC system to transmit and 
receive packets to other aircraft is limited to ranges 
less than 1 km. However at this range only 
approximately 10% of the packets were successfully 
received by the other aircraft.  If more than 50% of the 
packets transmitted need to be received for effective 
air traffic deconfliction, then the effective range 
becomes more like 400 m.  This amount of range may 
be inadequate for vehicles approaching each other at 
speeds greater than 10 m/s assuming a 30 second 
warning time. 
Results for 4G link testing in a rural environment 
indicate that some periods of signal loss were 
experienced as tested.  However, those periods of 
signal loss occurred more frequently on the ground 
likely a result of very low reference signal received 
power (RSRP) while the vehicle was directly on the 
ground.  RSRP increased quickly as altitude increased 
becoming good to excellent for a large majority of the 
time.  However, signal quality as indicated reference 
signal received quality (RSRQ) remained fair to poor 
for much of the time.  Vehicle maneuvering can affect 
cell reception due to observed antenna non-uniformity.  
While the closest cell tower was predominantly used as 
the primary connected tower, data indicates that many 
towers were connected to the vehicle throughout the 
flight test.  The maximum distance observed for a 
connected tower was more than 16 miles away.  It is 
considered that a combination of short-range direct 
communications link, such as a 900 MHz link, 
combined with a 4G based link could potentially 
provide required sUAS command and control (C2) 
functionality in rural areas. 
Initial results for post-processed Image-based 
Object Detection (IOD) indicate that sUAS can be 
detected at ranges up to 780 m (2,559 ft).  This result is 
significantly improved from previous work that used a 
larger field of view (FOV) lens with much lower 
resolution.   
Finally, testing of the highly-assured vehicle 
containment system known as Safeguard system was 
performed at speeds commensurate to fixed-wing 
sUAS aircraft.  Results from this testing indicated 
appropriate performance of the system to correctly 
identify the zones of operation (stay in this application) 
and provide warning and vehicle terminate messages. 
 
Future work 
Future work for DSRC testing should evaluate 
both higher transmit power levels along with more 
optimized antennas to improve the range of 
communications.  Future work is also recommended to 
further explore the capabilities of 4G cell link 
technologies to provide required communications 
performance.  Results for suburban and urban areas, 
with assumed higher-density of cell towers and 
potential obstructions would complement the current 
data.  Further work is being performed to fully analyze 
results for IOD algorithms as well as to define a 
baseline IOD system (i.e. camera, lens, algorithm, and 
computer) applicable for sUAS.  Subsequent testing of 
a baseline IOD system should be performed.  Failure 
mode effects analysis should be performed to compare 
and contrast an external geofence containment system 
(Safeguard) to one that hosts the system internally on 
the autopilot.  Lastly, subsequent testing of Safeguard 
should be performed at potentially higher speeds and 
more complex boundaries.  Fixed-wing vehicle 
dynamics during Safeguard terminations should also 
be evaluated to quantify the potential dispersions. 
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Appendix A: Flight run log 
All flights performed in support of the V2V-1 flight test effort are contained herein.  Column 1(#) is the reference line entry for this log.  Column 2 (Date) is 
the date the flight(s) were completed.  Colum 3 (Ops #) is the Ops day counter.  Colum 4 (V1) is the 1st vehicle in the run log data entry.  Note that flight pairs 
are entered twice once for each vehicle in the pair.  Column 5 is the flight number for that aircraft as logged in its log book.  Column 6 (V1 Alt) is the designated 
auto flight cruise altitude for Vehicle 1 in meters.  Column 7 (Flight Time) is Vehicle 1’s approximate flight time in minutes. Column 8 (Config) is the 
configuration for Vehicle 1.  Column 9 is the vehicle that was flown with Vehicle 1. Column 10 (V2 Alt) is Vehicle 2’s designated cruise altitude in meters.  
Column 11 (Botlink Data) indicates if valid Botlink data were acquired for Vehicle 1. Column 12 (V2V data) indicates if DSRC Vehicle to Vehicle data were 
acquired and if so what transmission path was tested (ATG=Air to Ground, ATA=Air to Air, GTA=Ground to Air). Column 13 (Video data) indicates if Image-
based Object Detection data were acquired for this flight pair.  Column 14 (SG) indicates if Safeguard data were acquired for Vehicle 1. 
# Date Ops # V1 V1 flt # 
V1 Alt 
(m) 
Flight 
Time 
(min) 
Config V2 V2 Alt (m) 
Botlink 
Data 
V2V 
data 
Video 
data SG 
1 8/3/2017 1 Mig-CC 22 200 9 V2V/Camera       
2 8/3/2017 1 Mig-CC 23 200 10 V2V/Camera       
3 8/25/2017 2 Mig-CC 24   V2V/Camera       
4 8/25/2017 2 Tempest-1 22  22       Y 
5 8/25/2017 2 Tempest-2 35 170 40    Y    
6 9/8/2017 3 Mig-LH 74 200 9 V2V/Camera       
7 9/29/2017 4 Tempest-1 27 
240 
200 
140 20 Safeguard       
8 9/29/2017 4 Tempest-2 36 
160 
200 
250 35 
ADS-
B/Unex/Botlink on   Y ATG   
9 10/3/2017 5 Tempest-2 37 
200 
250 14    Y ATG   
10 10/3/2017 5 Tempest-2 38 250 16  ?  Y ATG   
11 10/17/2017 6 Mig-CC 25   Baseline       
12 10/17/2017 6 Mig-CC 26   Baseline       
11 10/17/2017 6 Mig-CC 27   Baseline       
12 10/18/2017 7 Tarot-2 4  2 
V2V/Camera/Video 
TX       
13 10/18/2017 7 Tarot-2 5  5 
V2V/Camera/Video 
TX       
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# Date Ops # V1 V1 flt # 
V1 Alt 
(m) 
Flight 
Time 
(min) 
Config V2 V2 Alt (m) 
Botlink 
Data 
V2V 
data 
Video 
data SG 
14 10/18/2017 7 Tarot-2 6  2 
V2V/Camera/Video 
TX       
15 10/18/2017 7 Tarot-2 7  2 
V2V/Camera/Video 
TX       
16 10/18/2017 7 Tarot-2 8 200 13 
V2V/Camera/Video 
TX 
Tempest-
2    Y  
17 10/18/2017 7 Tarot-2 9 200 3 
V2V/Camera/Video 
TX       
18 10/18/2017 7 Tarot-2 10 200 10 
V2V/Camera/Video 
TX 
Tempest-
2    Y  
19 10/18/2017 7 Tempest-2 39 230 10 
ADS-
B/Unex/Botlink on ?  Y ATG   
20 10/18/2017 7 Tempest-2 40 230 13 
ADS-
B/Unex/Botlink on Tarot-2  Y ATG Y  
21 10/18/2017 7 Tempest-2 41 170 20 
ADS-
B/Unex/Botlink on Tarot-2  Y ATG Y  
22 10/19/2017 8 Mig-LH 75 200 10 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG   
23 10/19/2017 8 Mig-LH 76 200 10 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG   
24 10/19/2017 8 Mig-LH 77 200 10 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG   
25 10/19/2017 8 Tempest-2 42 200 24  Mig-LH  Y ATG   
26 10/19/2017 8 Tempest-2 43 170 16  Mig-LH  Y ATG   
27 10/19/2017 8 Tempest-2 44 230 18  Mig-LH  Y ATG   
28 10/31/2017 9 Mig-LH 78 200 11 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG   
29 10/31/2017 9 Mig-LH 79 200 11 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG   
30 10/31/2017 9 Mig-LH 80 200 11 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG   
31 10/31/2017 9 Tempest-2 45 170 20  Mig-LH  Y ATG   
32 10/31/2017 9 Tempest-2 46 200 20  Mig-LH  Y ATG   
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# Date Ops # V1 V1 flt # 
V1 Alt 
(m) 
Flight 
Time 
(min) 
Config V2 V2 Alt (m) 
Botlink 
Data 
V2V 
data 
Video 
data SG 
33 10/31/2017 9 Tempest-2 47 230 20  Mig-LH  Y ATG   
34 11/28/2017 10 Mig-LH 81 200 10 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG 
Shake/Swi
m  
35 11/28/2017 10 Mig-LH 82 200 11 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG Y  
36 11/28/2017 10 Mig-LH 83 200 11 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG Y  
37 11/28/2017 10 Mig-LH 84 200 12 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG Y  
38 11/28/2017 10 Tempest-1 28 200 11 Safeguard       
39 11/28/2017 10 Tempest-2 48 230 17 ADS-B on Mig-LH  Y ATG Y  
40 11/28/2017 10 Tempest-2 49 170 16 ADS-B off Mig-LH?  Y ATG Y  
41 11/28/2017 10 Tempest-2 50 200 16 ADS-B off Mig-LH?  Y ATG Y  
42 11/28/2017 10 Tempest-2 51 230 17 ADS-B off Mig-LH?  Y ATG Y  
43 11/30/2017 11 Mig-LH 85 200 11 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
1   ATG Y  
44 11/30/2017 11 Mig-LH 86 200 10 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2   ATG Y  
45 11/30/2017 11 Tempest-1 29 230 22 Safeguard Mig-LH    Y Y 
46 11/30/2017 11 Tempest-1 30 170 23 Safeguard      Y 
47 11/30/2017 11 Tempest-2 52 170 19 ADS-B off Mig-LH  Y 
ATG, 
ATA Y  
48 12/7/2017 12 Tarot-2 11 200 14 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2 170  
ATG, 
ATA Y  
49 12/7/2017 12 Tarot-2 12 200 12 V2V/Camera 
Tempest-
2 200  
ATG, 
ATA Y  
50 12/7/2017 12 Tarot-2 13 200 13 V2V/Camera Tarot-1   
ATG, 
ATA Dual  
51 12/7/2017 12 Tarot-2 14 200 13 V2V/Camera Tarot-1   
ATG, 
ATA Dual  
52 12/7/2017 12 Tempest-2 53 170 20 ADS-B off Tarot-2  Y 
ATG, 
ATA Y  
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# Date Ops # V1 V1 flt # 
V1 Alt 
(m) 
Flight 
Time 
(min) 
Config V2 V2 Alt (m) 
Botlink 
Data 
V2V 
data 
Video 
data SG 
53 12/7/2017 12 Tempest-2 54 200 20 ADS-B off Tarot-2  Y 
ATG, 
ATA Y  
54 12/7/2017 12 Tarot-1 55    Tarot-2   
ATG, 
ATA   
55 12/7/2017 12 Tarot-1 56    Tarot-2   
ATG, 
ATA   
   55 
Vehicl
e Flt #  734  36      
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